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I. INTRODUCTION 
In her 2015 Oscar acceptance speech, Patricia Arquette made an impassioned 
plea for pay equality: “To every woman who gave birth, to every taxpayer and 
citizen of this nation, we have fought for everybody else’s equal rights. It’s time 
2016 / Labor 
578 
to have wage equality once and for all. And equal rights for women in the United 
States of America.”
1
 Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson addressed Arquette’s speech 
at a press conference about her equal pay legislation and explained that the 
speech reached her on a personal level because, “before gray hair,” the Senator 
was one of the women fighting for equal pay.
2
 These comments illustrate that 
wage inequality based on gender is not a new problem; rather, it has been an 
issue for the past fifty years.
3
 
Women comprise more than fifty percent of the United States population,
4
 
and represent forty-seven percent of the work force.
5
 Yet, women in the United 
States make only seventy-eight percent of what men earn.
6
 The wage gap varies 
across education level, age, and income level; however, in each category, 
employers pay men more than women.
7
 For example, female partners working in 
the largest law firms in the United States earn eleven percent less than their male 
counterparts.
8
 Notably, women account for only four percent of partners in the 
top law firms.
9
 Employers generally pay white women more money than African 
American and Hispanic women across almost all education levels.
10
 In California, 
the general female population earns eighty-four percent of a man’s salary,
11
 
African American women earn sixty-four percent, and Latina women earn fifty-
 
1. Alex Needham & Rory Carroll, Patricia Arquette Uses Oscars Speech to Call for Equal Pay, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/film/2015/feb/22/patricia-arquette-oscars-speech-
equal-pay-women (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. Press Conference on Equal Pay, CAL. LEGIS. WOMEN’S CAUCUS (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://womenscaucus.legislature.ca.gov/equal-pay (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
3. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., 50 YEARS & COUNTING: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF ACHIEVING 
EQUAL PAY 1 (2013), available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/final_nwlc_equal_pay_ 
report.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
4. State and County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 8, 2015, 12:13 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
5. Women in the Professional Workforce, DEPT. OF PROF. EMP. AFL-CIO (Feb. 2015), 
http://dpeaflcio.org/ professionals/professionals-in-the-workplace/women-in-the-professional-and-technical-
labor-force/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
6. Female-to-Male Earnings Ratio and Median Earnings of Full-Time, Year-Round Workers 15 Years 
and Older by Sex: 1960 to 2013, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2014), available at https://www.census.gov/hhes/ 
www/income/data/incpovhlth/2013/figure2.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
7. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 1–3. 
8. AMER. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW 6 (2014), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance_statistics_july2014.authcheckd
am.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
9. Id. at 2. 
10. AAUW, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 14 (2015), available at 
http://www.aauw.org/research/the-simple-truth-about-the-gender-pay-gap/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
11. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, CALIFORNIA WOMEN AND THE WAGE GAP 1 (Apr. 2014), 
available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/fair-pay/california-women-
and-the-wage-gap.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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four percent.
12
 Senator Jackson introduced Chapter 546 to narrow this wage gap.
13
 
This article explains the legal background of the wage gap and analyzes Chapter 
546’s potential for narrowing the wage gap for California women.
14
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Despite numerous legislative efforts since 1963, the wage gap persists across 
the country, and the battle for equal pay is ongoing.
15
 The wage gap is “the 
difference in men’s and women’s median earnings, usually reported as either the 
earnings ratio between men and women or as an actual pay gap.”
16
 On average, in 
the United States, women make twenty-two percent less than men for doing the 
same work.
17
 In California, that figure is fifteen percent.
18
 
The federal Equal Pay Act plays a large role in California because courts use 
federal law to interpret the state’s equal pay legislation.
19
 However, the federal 
Equal Pay Act presents many obstacles for plaintiffs because of loopholes in its 
language.
20
 The Civil Rights Act provides another route for victims of wage 
inequality, but plaintiffs encountered difficulties with its statute of limitation 
until the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act extended the time for plaintiffs 
to bring discrimination suits under the federal Equal Pay Act.
21
 Because courts 
largely interpret the California Equal Pay Act under the federal Equal Pay Act, 
plaintiffs seeking equal pay under the California Equal Pay Act face similar 
barriers as those under the federal Equal Pay Act.
22
 This section will address the 
factors contributing to the wage gap,
23
 as well as existing federal and state laws 
 
12. Id. 
13. Press Conference on Equal Pay, supra note 2. 
14. See infra Parts II–IV (describing that current equal pay legislation has created obstacles for plaintiffs 
seeking equal pay through enforcing their rights under the various Acts). 
15.  NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, FIFTY YEARS AFTER THE EQUAL PAY ACT 4 (June 2013), available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/equalpay/equal_pay_task_force_progress_report_june_2013 
_new.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing that although equal pay legislation 
has made significant progress, there is more work to be done). 
16. AAUW, supra note 10. 
17. Id. 
18. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 11, at 1. 
19. See infra Part II.B (illustrating that California courts rely on federal interpretations of the federal 
Equal Pay Act to apply California’s former Equal Pay Act). 
20. See infra Parts II.B.1–3 (explaining how the language in the federal Equal Pay Act creates loopholes 
for employers to discriminatorily pay employees based on gender). 
21. See infra Part II.C (demonstrating the Civil Rights Act’s influence on wage equality); see also infra 
Part II.D (showing that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act extended the statute of limitations for wage 
inequality actions). 
22. See infra Part II.E (discussing the barriers plaintiffs encountered under the California Equal Pay Act). 
23. See infra Part II.A (identifying various explanations for the wage gap including pay secrecy, fear of 
retaliation, work-life balance, and cultural values). 
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prior to the enactment of Chapter 546 and their effectiveness in closing the wage 
gap.
24
  
A. Why Does the Wage Gap Exist? 
Many factors contribute to the wage gap.
25
 Pay secrecy is one of the main 
contributors to its persistence.
26
 When employees do not know how much their 
coworkers earn, they do not know a wage gap exists, much less have the ability 
to prove it.
27
 This secrecy is prevalent in the private sector where sixty-one 
percent of employers prohibit employees from discussing wages.
28
 Additionally, 
women also accept lower pay out of fear that their employers will retaliate 
against them for taking action to obtain equal pay.
29
 Another important factor is 
that many women with children choose more flexible hours with lower 
compensation to achieve a better work-life balance.
30
 When women return to 
work after taking extended family leave, employers often pay them less than 
male employees with the same job titles.
31
 
Some studies suggest the differences between male and female employment 
strategies explain the wage gap.
32
 For instance, men tend to negotiate for higher 
salaries whereas women are more likely to accept their salaries without 
negotiation.
33
 However, other studies show that women are consistently paid less 
for equal work regardless of the tactics they use.
34
  
Society perpetuates the wage gap because of embedded cultural norms and 
stereotypes about women.
35
 Although women comprise almost half of the work 
 
24. See infra Parts II.B–E (listing federal and state equal pay legislation and the obstacles they have 
created for plaintiffs). 
25. See infra Part II.A (identifying factors that contribute to the wage gap). 
26. Ann Friedman, TAP Talks with Lilly Ledbetter, AMER. PROSPECT (Apr. 23, 2008), 
http://prospect.org/article/tap-talks-lilly-ledbetter-0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); 
Hearing on SB 358 Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Indus. Relations, 2016 Leg., 2015-2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) 
(Jennifer Reich on behalf of Equal Rights Advocates) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
27. Id. 
28. AAUW, supra note 10, at 17; Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26. 
29. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 11; Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26. 
30. Michele Parente, How Can Women Close the Pay Gap?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (May 17, 2015, 
6:00 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/may/17/how-can-women-close-the-pay-gap/ (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
31. Id. 
32. NANCY M. CARTER & CHRISTINE SILVA, THE MYTH OF THE IDEAL WORKER: DOES DOING ALL THE 
RIGHT THINGS REALLY GET WOMEN AHEAD? 2 (2011), available at http://www.catalyst.org/ 
system/files/The_Myth_of_the_Ideal_Worker_Does_Doing_All_the_Right_Things_Really_Get_Women_Ahea
d.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); See Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 (Jennifer 
Reich explaining that individual choices do not explain why the wage gap exists). 
33. Id. at 11. 
34. Id. at 2. 
35. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 9. 
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force, society still characterizes them as caregivers, regardless of whether or not 
they have children.
36
 Cultural norms also place higher value on male work, which 
affects the amount employers pay women even if they do not intend to engage in 
overt discrimination.
37
 
B. Federal Equal Pay Act 
President Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act of 1963 into law as a part of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to address the gap between men and women’s 
earnings.
38
 At the time, “the typical woman working full time, year round” in the 
United States made about fifty-nine cents for every dollar a man earned.
39
 
The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from discriminating against 
employees based on sex.
40
 Specifically, it requires employers to pay employees 
the same wage when they perform work that “requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility.”
41
 The Equal Pay Act provides exceptions for unequal pay if the 
employer demonstrates that it based the pay differential on a merit or seniority 
system, a quality or quantity of production basis, or any factor that is not sex-
based.
42
 A seniority system allows an employer to pay workers more based on 
length of employment.
43
 Merit systems provide higher pay for some employees 
based on consistent periodic evaluations.
44
 Quantity or quality production systems 
reward higher productivity with higher pay, such as commission systems in 
department stores.
45
 
To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under the Equal Pay 
Act, the plaintiff must show the employer pays her less than a colleague of the 
opposite sex for equal work.
46
 The Act imposes a strict liability standard and thus 
 
36. Id.  
37. Barbara F. Reskin & Denise D. Bielby, A Sociological Perspective on Gender and Career Outcomes, 
19 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 71, 73 (2005), available at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles. 
php?doi=10.1257/0895330053148010 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Parente, supra 
note 30. 
38. NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, supra note 15; see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2007) (demonstrating 
the Equal Pay Act exists within the FLSA). 
39. Abby Lane & Katherine Gallagher Robbins, The Wage Gap Over Time, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. 
(May 3, 2012), http://www.nwlc.org/our-blog/wage-gap-over-time (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
40. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2007). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (Dec. 5, 2000) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
compensation.html#1.%20Seniority,%20Merit,%20or%20Incentive%20System%20Must%20Be%20Bona%20
Fide (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Green v. Par Pools Inc., 111 Cal. App. 4th 620, 626 (4th Dist. 2003). 
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does not require the plaintiff to show that the employer is intentionally or 
maliciously paying employees unequal wages.
47
 After the plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to demonstrate that 
the unequal pay is justifiable under the Act.
48
 As previously discussed, the Equal 
Pay Act provides four categories of allowable systems to explain unequal pay: a 
merit evaluation, seniority system, a work quality or quantity production system, 
or another factor not based on sex.
49
 If the employer can provide an acceptable 
reason for the unequal pay, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate 
the employer’s payroll method is pretext for discrimination.
50
 Plaintiffs may 
pursue a claim for unequal pay within two years of receipt of unequal pay unless 
the employer intentionally paid employees unequally, in which case, the statute 
of limitations is three years.
51
 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) administers and 
enforces the Equal Pay Act.
52
 If an employer violates the Equal Pay Act, the 
EEOC is responsible for repaying the employee his or her lost wages.
53
 The 
employer cannot reduce the wages of any employees to comply with the Act.
54
 
From 2000 to 2009, the EEOC investigated 829 charges for pay discrimination 
and recovered $52 million in damages for victims of wage discrimination.
55
 The 
gender wage gap has persisted despite Equal Pay Act enforcement.
56
 In 
interpreting the Equal Pay Act, courts have worked to define many operative 
terms of the act, including, “factor other than sex,” “same establishment,” and 
“equal work.”
57
 The judicial interpretations of these terms have created obstacles 
for plaintiffs enforcing their rights under the Act.
58
 
 
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2007) (not requiring intent for violations of the Equal Pay Act); see also  
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2008) (only requiring the plaintiff demonstrate unequal wages); Meeks v. Computer 
Assoc., 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding the Equal Pay Act establishes a strict liability standard for 
unequal pay). 
48. Green, 111 Cal. App. 4th at 626. 
49. Id. at 633. 
50. Id. at 625. 
51. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1974). Since the Equal Pay Act is part of the FLSA, the statute of limitations is 
found within the FLSA. Id. 
52. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 F.R. 19807 (1978), reprinted in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978) 
(transferring enforcement and administration of the Equal Pay Act to the EEOC). 
53. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2008). 
54. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2007). 
55. NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 22. 
56. Id. at 23. 
57. See infra Parts II.B.1–3 (explaining how courts interpret factor other than sex). 
58. See infra Parts II.B.1–3 (identifying obstacles created by the federal Equal Pay Act). 
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1. Factor Other than Sex 
An employer’s affirmative defense to an Equal Pay Act violation is to argue 
that any inequality in pay is based on a factor other than sex.
59
 This exception 
“prevents the employer from relying on a compensation differential that is 
merely a pretext for sex discrimination—e.g., determining salaries on the basis of 
an employee’s height or weight, when those factors have no relevance to the job 
at issue.”
60
 Plaintiffs in many cases are unable to provide sufficient evidence 
demonstrating pretext when employers list factors other than sex as a reason for 
unequal pay, and, as such, many plaintiffs are barred from relief.
61
 
2. Same Establishment Requirement 
Employees encounter further obstacles when suing for unequal pay because 
the statute requires plaintiffs to show that their employers are paying other 
employees in the same establishment more for equal work.
62
 The “same 
establishment” language requires the employees being compared have to work in 
the same physical building.
63
 Therefore, every “physically separate place of 
business” is its own establishment.
64
 The EEOC applies the “same establishment” 
requirement more broadly in some situations.
65
 In unusual circumstances, “two or 
more distinct physical portions of a business enterprise” may be treated as a 
single establishment.
66
 For example, “a central administrative unit” may control 
aspects of hiring, setting wages, and assigning duties, in which case it would be 
more appropriate to consider separate physical locations as a single 
 
59. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2007). 
60. Engelmann v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., No. 94 CIV 5616 (MBM), 1996 WL 76107, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 1996). 
61. See Green v. Par Pools Inc., 111 Cal. App. 4th 620, 626 (4th Dist. 2003) (finding plaintiff could not 
show pretext when employer’s justification for unequal pay was due to male employee having more 
experience); Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that plaintiff could not 
show pretext when male colleague had greater qualifications than she did); Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955–56 
(11th Cir. 1995) (holding that both prior salary and experience were “factors other than sex” that barred 
plaintiff’s discrimination claim); see also Closing the “Factor Other Than Sex” Loophole in the Equal Pay Act, 
NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://www.nwlc.org/resource/closing-factor-other-sex-
loophole-equal-pay-act [hereinafter Factor Other Than Sex] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (“Some courts have interpreted the “factor other than sex” defense to permit employers to pay 
discriminatory wages for a limitless number of reasons.”).  
62. See Renstrom v. Nash Finch Co., 787 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (D. Minn. 2011) (deciding two 
distribution centers run by a central company were two separate establishments); Factor Other Than Sex, supra 
note 61 (explaining the numerous factors employers can list as a “factor other than sex”). 
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a) (2015). 
64. Id. 
65. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(b) (2015) (listing several scenarios that the EEOC considers a “single 
establishment”). 
66. Id. 
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establishment.
67
 Without these “unusual circumstances,” courts will not find 
“physically separate place[s] of business” to be the same establishment.
68
 
Broader application of the same establishment requirement provided support 
for a wage discrimination suit against a school district that paid male janitors 
more than female janitors.
69
 The court held that the school district operated as a 
single establishment because it operated as a single administrative unit that 
controlled all aspects of the school district’s business like hiring, firing, and 
setting wages.
70
 A broad application of the same establishment requirement 
helped the plaintiffs in this case, but not in others.
71
 Some courts have declined to 
apply the broad interpretation even while recognizing that labor has changed 
since 1963 and that public policy probably requires a change in the definition of 
same establishment.
72
 
3. Equal Work 
Plaintiffs have also encountered challenges as courts struggle to find a 
comprehensive definition of equal work.
73
 Courts must determine “whether the 
jobs in question are sufficiently related and sufficiently similar in skill, effort, 
responsibility, and working conditions, as to be substantially equal.”
74
 Work is 
substantially equal when employees utilize different machines in carrying out the 
same duties,
75
 employees have different job titles but perform the same duties,
76
 
and female employees temporarily replace male employees in their job 
positions.
77
 Courts have found work was not substantially equal when higher-paid 
employees performed additional, substantial duties;
78
 and, in another situation, a 
 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Brennan v. Goose Greek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1975). 
70. Id. 
71. See id. (applying the broad interpretation of the same establishment requirement allowed plaintiffs to 
meet their prima facie case); see also Renstrom v. Nash Finch Co., 787 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (D. Minn. 2011) 
(holding plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden of proof because the court refused to apply the broad 
interpretation of the same establishment requirement). 
72. Renstrom, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 967. 
73. Press Conference on Equal Pay, supra note 2. 
74. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
75. Id. 
76. Goodrich v. Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 712 F.2d 1488, 1493–94 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(finding that regardless of title, it is the content of the work which will determine whether work is substantially 
equal). 
77. See Marshall v. Sch. Bd., Hermitage Sch. Dist., 599 F.2d 1220, 1222 (3rd Cir. 1979) (finding female 
employees who temporarily replaced male employees should have been paid the same wages the male 
employees would have made had they performed the work). 
78. Goodrich, 712 F.2d 1488, at 1493–94 (finding that in certain situations additional duties may 
constitute unequal work). 
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court found work was not substantially equal when one class of workers 
performed heavy duty cleaning duties two to three hours a week and the other 
class of workers did not.
79
 
C. Civil Rights Act 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides employees additional protection from 
discrimination because of their “race, color, religion, [or] sex.”
80
 The Civil Rights 
Act prohibits employers from firing employees for discriminatory reasons, 
segregating or classifying employees based on one of the previously mentioned 
factors, or discriminatorily refusing to hire prospective employees.
81
 Employers 
cannot segregate, classify, or limit employees based on these factors in a way that 
creates a disparate impact on employment opportunities.
82
 Under the Civil Rights 
Act, a plaintiff must first file a complaint with the EEOC and exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to seeking a judicial remedy.
83
 Courts struggled to 
interpret the Equal Pay Act and Civil Rights Act together because Senator 
Wallace Bennett added an amendment to the Civil Rights Act immediately 
before Congress enacted it.
84
 The Bennett Amendment states that it is lawful for 
employers to have sex-based wage differentials “if such differentiation is 
authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29,”
85
 which lists the 
categories employers can use to explain unequal pay.
86
 
International Union of Electrical Radio and Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse 
demonstrates how courts struggled to address the Bennett Amendment.
87
 In 
Westinghouse, the plaintiffs claimed their employer used a classification system 
that discriminated against female employees because the company separated 
types of work by “male jobs” and “female jobs,” assigned each category value 
points, and then based salaries on those points.
88
 The court had to decide whether 
to broadly or narrowly interpret the Bennett Amendment based on the words “is 
authorized by.”
89
 If broadly interpreted, the court would incorporate the same 
 
79. Marshall v. Bldg. Maint. Corp., 587 F.2d 567, 570–71 (2nd Cir. 1978).  
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2015). 
81. Id. 
82. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
83. Demissie v. Starbucks Corporate Office and Headquarters, 19 F. Supp. 3d 321, 324 (D.D.C. 2014). 
84. Int’l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 
F.2d 1094, 1099 (3rd Cir. 1980). 
85. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2007). 
86. 631 F.2d at 1099. 
87. See id. (identifying the various meanings the Bennett Amendment could have and what their 
implications would be). 
88. Id. at 1097. The Equal Pay Act does not prohibit classification systems that produce discriminatory 
wages, but the Civil Rights Act does. Id. 
89. Id. 
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requirements found in the Equal Pay Act while also allowing protection against 
discriminatory classification systems.
90
 However, a narrow interpretation would 
confine the Civil Rights Act to the limitations of the Equal Pay Act.
91
 The court 
found that the Civil Rights Act incorporated the Equal Pay Act because The Civil 
Rights Act protects people from a broad range of discrimination including 
religion, race, and national origin.
92
 Consequently, it was logical for the Civil 
Rights Act to protect against sex discrimination as well.
93
 Thus, the Civil Rights 
Act helped expand protection for employees by prohibiting discriminatory 
employment practices outside the scope of the Equal Pay Act, but that result in 
wage discrimination.
94
 
The Civil Rights Act also protects employees by making it unlawful for 
employers to require one gender to pay more for health insurance or retirement 
fees than the other gender based on common gender-related characteristics like 
lifespan.
95
 Though the Civil Rights Act expanded protection against 
discriminatory business practices like classification systems, it is still difficult for 
employees to enforce their rights under the Equal Pay Act.
96
 
D. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act 
For many years, courts imposed a very short statute of limitation requirement 
under the Equal Pay Act, thereby disadvantaging plaintiffs.
97
 For example, in 
1998, Lilly Ledbetter sued her employer, Goodyear Tire, for unequal pay under 
the Civil Rights Act.
98
 Ledbetter alleged unfair evaluations prevented her from 
making as much money as her male colleagues.
99
 Because Ledbetter’s employer 
had a policy prohibiting wage discussion between employees, as many employers 
do, Ledbetter was unaware she made less than her male colleagues until she 
received an anonymous letter explaining the pay differences.
100
 The Supreme 
Court barred Ledbetter’s claim because the Court characterized Goodyear’s 
discrimination as a systematic business practice, which meant Ledbetter only had 
180 days after the first discriminatory pay check to file a complaint with the 
 
90. Id. at 1103. 
91. Id. at 1102. 
92. Id. at 1107. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. City of L.A., Dep’t. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). 
96. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 642 (2007) (holding the statute of 
limitations barred plaintiff’s claim for gender discrimination). 
97. See infra Part II.D (describing the negative effects of the short statute of limitations). 
98. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618. 
99. Id. at 622. 
100. Friedman, supra note 26. 
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EEOC.
101
 This decision severely restricted the time period for employees to bring 
claims for sex discrimination under the Civil Rights Act.
102
 
In response to the Court’s ruling in Ledbetter, President Obama signed The 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act (LLFPRA) into law in 2009.
103
 The 
LLFPRA extends the time during which employees can bring sex discrimination 
claims by providing that each paycheck with a discriminatory wage is a separate 
violation of both the Equal Pay Act and the Civil Rights Act.
104
 This LLFPRA 
restarts the 180-day statute of limitations with every discriminatory paycheck.
105
 
E. Prior California Law 
In 1949, California passed and enacted its own version of the Equal Pay Act 
(CEPA), which was last amended in 1985.
106
 CEPA prohibits employers from 
discrimination against employees who work in the same establishment and 
perform work that “requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility.”
107
 CEPA also 
provides exceptions for pay differentials when the unequal pay is due to a 
seniority or merit system, a system based on quality or quantity of production, or 
any other factor independent from sex.
108
 To bring a cause of action, the statute of 
limitations is two years after the incident occurs, or three years after the incident 
if the violation is willful.
109
 CEPA does not prohibit retaliatory action against an 
employee who pursues equal pay through its provisions.
110
 Because of the 
similarities between the CEPA and the federal Equal Pay Act, courts often rely 
on interpretations of the federal statute to analyze cases brought under CEPA.
111
 
Consequently, employees face the same barriers to recovery as they do through 
the federal Equal Pay Act.
112
 
 
101. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 642. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2009) (“A charge under this section shall 
be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice 
of the charge.”). 
102. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618. 
103. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks at Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act Signing 
(Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-lilly-
ledbetter-fair-pay-restoration-act-bill-signing [hereinafter Obama] (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2009). 
105. Id. 
106. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(a) (West 2015). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. § 1197.5(h). 
110. Id. 
111. See Green v. Par Pools Inc., 111 Cal. App. 4th 620, 623 (2003) (finding that because the California 
Equal Pay Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 are “nearly identical,” courts will “rely on federal authorities 
construing the federal statute”). 
112. See supra Part II.A (identifying problems plaintiffs faced under the Equal Pay Act). 
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In 1980, the legislature enacted the California Fair Employment and Housing 
Act (FEHA) to protect people from employer discrimination “because of the 
race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental 
disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, 
gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and 
veteran status of any person.”
113
 Though FEHA protects against gender and sex 
discrimination in the workplace, it does not explicitly prohibit wage 
discrimination.
114
 
In Hall v. County of Los Angeles, Danna Hall brought a class action lawsuit 
on behalf of 200 female attorneys under FEHA and CEPA for wage 
discrimination resulting from disparate impact through job classifications.
115
 Los 
Angeles County hired Hall to provide legal services in the juvenile court because 
the existing attorneys were over-burdened.
116
 The county paid these new hires 
less than another tier of employees, even though both tiers performed equal 
work.
117
 The court required Hall to show the “County chose the particular policy 
because of its effect on members of a protected class, not just that the County 
was aware that a given policy would lead to adverse consequences for a given 
group.”
118
 The court held Hall failed to meet her burden of proof because she 
could not show her employer intentionally discriminated against women.
119
 
III. CHAPTER 546 
Senator Jackson introduced Chapter 546 to clarify existing legislation 
addressing the wage gap.
120
 Chapter 546 removes the requirement in the CEPA 
that workers who are paid more than the plaintiff work in the same 
establishment.
121
 Chapter 546 requires equal pay for employees performing 
substantially similar work unless an employer demonstrates the wage differential 
is due to a payroll system based on seniority or merit, a quality or quantity 
production basis, or another factor aside from sex that qualifies as a business 
necessity.
122
 The burden of proof rests with employers to demonstrate that wage 
differentials have a basis aside from sex.
123
 
 
113. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2015).  
114. Id. 
115. Hall v. L.A., 148 Cal. App. 4th 318, 321 (2007). 
116. Id. at 320–21.  
117. Id. at 322–23. 
118. Id. at 326–27. 
119. Id. at 327. 
120. Press Conference on Equal Pay, supra note 2. 
121.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 546). 
122. § 1197.5(a)(1)(A)–(D) (amended by Chapter 546). 
123. Id. 
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Chapter 546 defines business necessity as “an overriding legitimate business 
purpose.”
124
 If an employer demonstrates that the wage differential is due to a 
factor that meets the business necessity requirement, the burden shifts back to the 
employee to demonstrate that there is another business practice that could fulfill 
the same business need without resulting in a wage differential.
125 
An employer cannot retaliate against or fire employees for attempting to 
exercise their rights under Chapter 546.
126
 Furthermore, an employer cannot bar 
employees from disclosing or discussing their wages.
127
 Chapter 546 imposes a 
one-year statute of limitations specific to the provisions regarding employer 
retaliation.
128
 The statute of limitations to bring a claim for wage discrimination is 
two years, and for intentional discrimination, is three years.
129
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Senator Jackson introduced Chapter 546 with the intent to close the wage gap 
for women, but more specifically, reduce the wage gap for Hispanic and African 
American women.
130
 The following sections will analyze the effect of Chapter 
546 on both of those groups and determine whether Chapter 546 will achieve its 
goal.
131
 
A. Elimination of the Same Establishment Requirement 
Proponents of Chapter 546 insist it will make it easier for plaintiffs to bring 
suits against employers for discriminatory pay by changing the wording of the 
original CEPA to eliminate the loopholes the old language created.
132
 For 
instance, Chapter 546 eliminates the same establishment requirement, which 
previously made it difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate a prima facie case when 
colleagues worked in physically separate locations.
133
 Employees now have the 
ability to challenge employers for sex discrimination when a higher paid 
 
124. § 1197.5(a)(1)(D) (amended by Chapter 546). 
125. Id. 
126. § 1197.5(j)(1) (amended by Chapter 546). 
127. Id.  
128. Id. 
129. § 1197.5(a)(3)(h) (amended by Chapter 546). 
130. Press Conference on Equal Pay, supra note 2. 
131. See infra Parts IV.1–2 (analyzing Chapter 546’s effect on the female population, but specifically 
Chapter 546’s effect on female minority groups). 
132. Halima Kazem, California Equal Pay Bill Shields Women from Retaliation for Discussing Wages, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2015 10:59 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/21/california-fair-pay-
act-wage-gap-women-men (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Hearing on SB 358, supra 
note 26. 
133. Id. 
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colleague works in a different “physical place of business,” but still performs 
substantially similar work.
134
 With this change, plaintiff Lannie Staniford, who 
was previously barred from bringing a suit because her better-paid male 
colleague worked in Fresno while she worked in San Francisco, would be able to 
challenge her employer for paying him more even though the two employees 
worked in different cities.
135
 Therefore, Chapter 546 broadens the class of 
employees to whom workers may compare their salaries beyond the class 
specified under federal law.
136
 
B. Business Necessity Requirement for Factors Other Than Sex 
Prior to Chapter 546, CEPA allowed employers to provide any factor not 
based on sex to justify equal pay.
137
 Now, CEPA will require employers to ensure 
that this factor is consistent with a business necessity.
138
 The business necessity 
requirement may create a higher burden on employers who discriminate because 
they will be hard pressed to come up with factors based on business necessities 
that will justify paying employees unequally based on gender.
139
 However, the 
business necessity requirement may not change how courts adjudicate wage 
discrimination cases in California.
140
 California state courts use interpretations of 
the Federal Equal Pay Act to interpret CEPA.
141
 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals already requires employers to provide a business-related explanation 
when they use the “factor other than sex” justification.
142
 If this language change 
were made in a state that does not currently require a business-related 
explanation for factors other than sex, the change would have had a much greater 
effect on a plaintiff’s ability to establish an employer is engaging in wage 
discrimination.
143
 
 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. See supra Part IV.A (explaining how Chapter 546 eliminates the same establishment requirement). 
137. See supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that the “factor other than sex” requirement allowed employers 
to identify any factor to justify unequal pay); Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 (Jennifer Reich giving 
examples of cases where the same establishment requirement barred plaintiffs from relief). 
138. Kazem, supra note 13. 
139. Id.; see Hearing on SB 358 supra, note 26 (California Chamber of Commerce identifying concerns 
regarding an employer’s ability to name a factor other than sex and expressing concern that this standard is too 
high). 
140. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that courts in the Ninth Circuit already require the “factor other than 
sex” be a business necessity). 
141. See supra Part II.E (demonstrating that California state courts rely on federal court interpretations of 
the federal Equal Pay Act to interpret CEPA). 
142. Wachter-Young v. Ohio Cas. Group, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002). 
143. Wernsing v. Dep’t. of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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Though Chapter 546 is not changing the standard for the “factor other than 
sex” justification in California, it provides a backup plan should the Supreme 
Court of the United States decide the issue differently than the Ninth Circuit, 
since there is currently a circuit split.
144
 If the Supreme Court agrees with the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Chapter 546 would ensure California 
employers still have the burden to demonstrate the “factor other than sex” is a 
business necessity.
145
 
Some employers use salary matching as a justification for unequal pay, 
claiming it is a “factor other than sex.”
146
 With salary matching, employers offer 
to pay new employees the same or more than they made at their previous 
positions.
147
 Salary matching often perpetuates unequal pay because employers 
cannot ascertain whether the employee’s previous pay was a result of gender 
discrimination.
148
 If plaintiffs can demonstrate another business method that could 
produce the same result without the wage differential, Chapter 546 could remedy 
this cycle of unequal pay.
149
 
The Ninth Circuit not only already provides plaintiffs with the opportunity to 
prove that the payment method is a pretext, but its courts also allow employers to 
claim that salary matching is a legitimate business reason for unequal pay.
150
 In 
order to overcome the employer’s defense, a plaintiff would have to prove an 
alternative business practice that would produce the same result as salary 
matching without causing unequal pay.
151
 
The Governor recently vetoed AB 1017, which Assembly Member Nora 
Campos introduced to narrow the wage gap.
152
 AB 1017 sought to prohibit 
employers from asking new employees about their previous salaries.
153
 In the 
Governor’s veto message, he acknowledged that he signed Chapter 546 and that 
it is necessary to give Chapter 546 the chance to effectuate change before 
 
144. See infra Part IV.B (showing that if the Supreme Court did not find a business necessity was 
required for the factor other than sex reason for unequal pay, Chapter 546 would provide California citizens 
with state legislation that did include this requirement). 
145. See supra Part III (explaining that Chapter 546 requires a factor other than sex be a business 
necessity). 
146. Factor Other Than Sex, supra note 61. 
147. Id. 
148. Id.; see Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26.  
149. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(a)(1)(A)-(D) (amended by Chapter 546). See Kazem, supra note 139 
(describing the plaintiff’s ability to provide an alternative business practice that wouldn’t create a wage 
differential). 
150. Wachter-Young v. Ohio Cas. Group, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2002). 
151. Kazem, supra note 132. 
152. Press Release, Assistant Democratic Leader Nora Campos, The California Senate Agrees, Equal Pay 
Matters (Sept. 1, 2015), http://asmdc.org/members/a27/news-room/press-releases/the-california-senate-agrees-
equal-pay-matters (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
153. Id. 
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enacting more legislation.
154
 However, Chapter 546 does not address the specific 
issue that AB 1017 would have.
155
 Under Chapter 546, an employer can still ask a 
new employee what her salary was at her last job.
156
 Some employers argue that 
obtaining this information is crucial to staying competitive, assessing the market 
rate, and other purposes.
157
 The problem is that hiring practices like salary 
matching often perpetuate the wage gap because many women were already paid 
less than their male counterparts at their previous jobs.
158
 Because AB 1017 and 
Chapter 546 address the wage gap on different levels and for different 
contributing factors, the legislature should put the same bill forward next year.
159
 
C. Substantially Similar Work Standard 
Chapter 546 also seeks to close the “equal work” standard loophole by 
replacing it with a “substantially similar work” standard.
160
 Supporters of Chapter 
546 explain that by changing the “equal work” standard to “substantially similar 
work,” plaintiffs will increase their ability to enforce their rights.
161
 However, all 
of the circuit courts that have considered the issue already interpret equal work 
under the federal Equal Pay Act to mean “substantially equal.”
162
 
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, the Supreme Court noted that Congress 
intended for the meaning of “equal work” to include factors like “skill, effort, 
responsibility, and working conditions.”
163
 Since California courts use federal law 
to interpret CEPA, it is likely that state courts would find “substantially similar 
work” equivalent to “substantially equal” under the federal Equal Pay Act.
164
 For 
example, like California’s, Illinois’ Equal Pay Act requires equal pay for the 
“same or substantially similar work.”
165
 In both California and Illinois, most wage 
discrimination claims are brought under both the state and federal equal pay acts; 
 
154. GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR., VETO MESSAGE AB 1017 (2015). 
155.  Hearing on AB 1017 Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Indus. Relations, 2016 Leg., 2015-2016 Sess. 
(Cal. 2015) (Jennifer Reich discussing the ways AB 1017 complements Chapter 546).  
156. See Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 (Jennifer Reich). 
157. See Hearing on AB 1017, supra note 155 (Senator Jeff Stone expressing employer concerns). 
158. See Hearing on AB 1017, supra note 155 (Jennifer Reich); See Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 
(Jennifer Reich demonstrating that practices like salary matching may not be intentionally discriminatory but 
nonetheless have a discriminatory impact).  
159. See Hearing on AB 1017, supra note 155 (Jennifer Reich explaining how salary matching leads to 
the wage gap).  
160. Press Conference on Equal Pay, supra note 2; Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 
161. Kazem, supra note 132; See Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26. 
162. See Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (explaining that all circuit courts to 
consider the issue interpret equal work as substantially similar work, except for the First Circuit who has yet to 
decide the issue). 
163. 417 U.S. 188, 201 (1974). 
164. See infra Part IV.C (explaining how another court applies the substantially similar work standard). 
165. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 112/10 (West 2004). 
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in fact, only Illinois has a case that has been tried under the state’s Equal Pay Act 
without the federal Equal Pay Act.
166
 As a result, courts construe state claims in 
accordance with federal law, which means they interpret “substantially similar 
work” as being equivalent to “substantially equal.”
167
 If a plaintiff brought a claim 
only under California or Illinois law, it is still likely that the courts would use the 
same factors federal courts do to determine if work is substantially equal.
168
 As 
evidenced by the only reported case in Illinois in which the plaintiff brought a 
claim for wage discrimination under Illinois law alone, the court used the 
employees’ duties and responsibilities to determine whether their work was 
“substantially similar.”
169
 The analysis of the Illinois court parallels the analysis a 
court would take in a federal wage discrimination claim.
170
 It therefore seems 
likely that courts will interpret Chapter 546’s “substantially similar” standard in 
line with the construction of the federal “equal work” standard.
171
 Consequently, 
it is unlikely that changing the term “equal work” to “substantially similar work” 
will alter the outcome of California wage discrimination claims.
172
 
Overall, this linguistic change does not indicate an overwhelmingly clear 
change in a plaintiff’s ability to establish a prima facie case for wage 
discrimination based on gender.
173
 
D. Chapter 546 and Minority Women 
Though proponents argue that Chapter 546 will benefit minority women 
more than white women,
174
 Chapter 546 provides no racial minority-specific 
benefits.
175
 While Chapter 546 may make it a little easier for women to bring 
successful claims under CEPA, employment litigation is expensive.
176
 Since 
minority women generally earn less than white women,
177
 minority women will 
 
166. Illinois Dep’t. of Labor v. 2000 W. Madison Liquor Corp., 394 Ill. App. 3d 813, 818–19 (2009). 
167. See id. (interpreting substantially similar work in the same way “substantially equal” is interpreted). 
168. See id. (using similar factors as federal courts to identify substantially equal work). 
169. Id. 
170. See supra Part IV.C (explaining how federal courts analyze the equal work standard). 
171. See id. (demonstrating the similarity between Illinois’s equal pay legislation and Chapter 546). 
172. See id. (assessing the impact of changing the words ‘equal work” to “substantially similar work”).  
173. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing Chapter 546’s changes and explaining they will not make a plaintiff’s 
case easier or more successful); See Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 (Jennifer Reich explaining that Chapter 
546 codifies language that the Supreme Court of the United States already uses).  
174. Press Conference on Equal Pay, supra note 2. 
175. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (amended by Chapter 546) (not mentioning racial minorities). 
176. Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution, DEP’T OF LABOR, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/dunlop/section4.htm [hereinafter DEP’T OF LABOR] (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
177. AAUW, supra note 10, at 10. 
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be less able to afford litigating employment claims.
178
 It is therefore unlikely that 
Chapter 546 will level the playing field between men and minority women.
179
 
While creating a statute that solely promotes wage equality amongst minority 
women may be difficult due to equal protection concerns,
180
 California legislators 
have expressed their intentions to continue to draft legislation that supports 
reducing the wage gap for minority women.
181
 Thus, Chapter 546 may not be the 
solution to minority women’s fight for wage equality, but California is taking 
steps to reach this goal.
182
 
E. Increased Litigation 
Opponents of eliminating the “same establishment” requirement warn that it 
could lead to an upsurge of litigation and employee unionizing.
183
 Employment 
litigation is expensive because “for every dollar paid to employees through 
litigation, at least another dollar is paid to attorneys involved in handling both 
meritorious and non-meritorious claims.”
184
 Employers have to pay lawyers not 
only to directly handle litigation, but also to design preventative practices to 
avoid potential lawsuits with employees.
185
 These issues create significant costs 
for employers and can force them to pay employees less in order to balance their 
resources.
186
 Because Chapter 546 will likely increase litigation, at least initially, 
employers could incur costs that may result in lower wages or fewer jobs.
187
 
Though some employees may benefit from the increased litigation Chapter 
546’s enactment brings about, others may not.
188
 Lawsuits are not only expensive 
for employees, but also stressful, disappointing, time consuming, and 
 
178. See DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 176 (finding that employment litigation is expensive); see also 
AAUW, supra note 10, at 7 (describing African American and Hispanic women as more likely to be poor than 
white women). 
179. See supra Part IV.C (explaining why Chapter 546 does not specifically help minority women). 
180. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (explaining that admissions 
practices at universities which draw racial distinctions are subject to strict judicial scrutiny). 
181. Press Conference on Equal Pay, supra note 2. 
182. Id. 
183. See Frank Van Dusen, Lilly Ledbetter Law May Create Recordkeeping Headache for Employers, 
MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.millernash.com/lilly-ledbetter-law-may-create-
recordkeeping-headache-for-employers-02-03-2009/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(analyzing removing the same establishment in the context of the Paycheck Fairness Act). See also Hearing on 
SB 358, supra note 26 (California Chamber of Commerce expressed concern about increasing litigation). 
184. See DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 176 (explaining the costs and effects of litigation on employers and 
employees). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id.; see Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 (Senator Jeff Stone discussing the concerns regarding 
increased litigation). 
188. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 176. 
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embarrassing.
189
 Discrimination cases can also take years to get to trial.
190
 In the 
meantime, employees often must expose their personal lives to investigation.
191
 
Aside from the costs employers and employees incur, employment litigation 
caused by stricter standards in equal pay legislation like Chapter 546 may 
negatively impact the economy and business practices in California and the rest 
of the United States.
192
 The more money businesses spend to defend and prevent 
discrimination litigation, the less money they can invest in their own products, 
research, and employees.
193
 In order to avoid some of employment litigation’s 
harsh consequences, the EEOC encourages alternative dispute resolution prior to 
commencing lawsuits.
194
 Senator Hanna-Beth Jackson squarely responded to 
concerns of increased litigation: “If we need to have some litigation that is finally 
going to open up a path that has been closed to women for years, to set the 
direction for businesses to follow, that’s not a bad thing.”
195
 
F. Wage Disclosure 
Chapter 546 concerns employers because it prohibits employers from 
forbidding employees to discuss their wages.
196
 However, Chapter 546 does not 
require employers to publish employees’ wages.
197
 Furthermore, even though 
Chapter 546 gives employees the ability to disclose and discuss wages, most 
employees typically refrain from discussing wages due to discomfort.
198
 
 
189. Id.; see Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 (Aileen Rizo, a current plaintiff in a wage discrimination 
lawsuit, discussing the difficulties she’s experienced under current equal pay legislation). 
190. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 176. 
191. Id. 
192. Litigation Protects and Ruins Businesses: Litigation Impact on Cost, Valuation . . . Social Media . . . 
Outlook for Litigations—2013, BIZSHIFTS-TRENDS (Feb. 7, 2013), http://bizshifts-trends.com/2013/02/07/ 
litigation-protects-and-ruins-businesses-litigation-strategies-and-impact-on-cost-valuation-social-media-
outlook-for-litigations-2013/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
193. Id. 
194. See DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 176 (describing the benefits of in-house ADR systems over 
litigation). 
195. See Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26. 
196. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(j)(1) (as amended by Chapter 546); see Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 
(Senator Stone identifying employer concerns regarding wage disclosure). 
197. See id. (preventing employers from prohibiting wage discussion but not mandating wage disclosure); see 
Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 (Jennifer Reich explaining that Chapter 546 does not require wage 
disclosure).  
198. Jacquelyn Smith, How to Handle Uncomfortable Salary Discussions at Work, FORBES (Apr. 12, 
2013 3:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/04/12/how-to-handle-uncomfortable-salary-
discussions-at-work/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see Hearing on SB 358, supra 
note 26 (Jennifer Reich describing women’s fear of retaliation for inquiring about wages). 
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If Chapter 546 could legally mandate wage disclosure,
199
 such disclosure 
would likely further narrow the wage gap.
200
 In Washington D.C., women make 
ninety percent of men’s salaries, which is the closest male to female earnings 
ratio in the country.
201
 There is a low wage gap because the federal government 
employs a majority of the population in Washington D.C. and requires employee 
wage information disclosure.
202
 Not only does mandated wage disclosure make 
employees aware of their wages in comparison with coworkers,
203
 but pay 
transparency also gives employers the opportunity to become aware of pay 
inequality before employees pursue litigation.
204
 Because unequal pay can often 
result from subconscious stereotypes, bias, and negative cultural values regarding 
women,
205
 mandated wage disclosure would force employers to directly confront 
their pay systems and eliminate unconscious biases.
206
 Although Chapter 546 
does not, and arguably no bill can, mandate wage disclosure, the California 
legislature is working to provide legislation that will decrease pay secrecy in the 
workplace.
207
  
G. Chapter 546 Does Not Solve the Wage Gap 
Based on the changes Chapter 546 makes to CEPA, it is unlikely Chapter 
546 will substantially reduce the wage gap in California.
208
 While it is likely that 
Chapter 546 will increase discrimination litigation,
209
 which may in turn make 
employers and the public more aware of the wage gap, the lack of significant 
changes to CEPA will probably not affect the outcome of wage discrimination 
 
199. See Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1 (West 1974) (stating that all citizens enjoy a right to privacy which implies 
that mandatory wage disclosure is not legal). 
200. See infra Part IV.F (mandatory wage disclosure produces lower wage gap rates among men and 
women). 
201. Juliet Eilperin, On Equal Pay, D.C. Comes Out On Top, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/04/09/on-equal-pay-d-c-comes-out-on-top/ (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
202. Id.; see Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26. 
203. Elperin, supra note 201; see Hearing on SB 358, supra note 26 (Jennifer Reich explaining that more 
information is always ideal and helps women narrow the wage gap). 
204. See Chris Joseph, What Are the Benefits of Equal Pay for Women & Men?, CHRON (2015), 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/benefits-equal-pay-women-men-11771.html (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
205. See supra Part II.A (describing the factors causing the wage gap). 
206. See Joseph, supra note 197 (explaining that employers would be aware of discriminatory pay wages 
if they were confronted with employee salaries). 
207. Press Release, supra note 150. 
208. See supra Part IV.A–B (analyzing Chapter 546’s impact on CEPA litigation). 
209. Supra Part IV.A. 
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cases.
210
 Although plaintiffs may not have the successes that some predict, there 
is great value in codifying strong equal pay legislation.
211
 Laws are the foundation 
for equal rights; they provide remedies for victims of prejudice and they set a 
cultural tone for how the nation views discrimination.
212
 Cultural practices have a 
strong connection to the codified laws in a state.
213
 Laws greatly impact women in 
our society, especially when laws disadvantage them.
214
 Therefore, although 
Chapter 546 may not have an overwhelming impact on plaintiff actions in civil 
suits, the chaptering of this legislation will likely be a strong starting point.
215
 In 
moving forward, the California legislature should push for legislation like AB 
1017, which prohibits employers from basing employee salary on prior income, 
and should work to find solutions to pay secrecy so that employees are informed 
and able to enforce their rights under Chapter 546.
216
 
V. CONCLUSION
 
When he signed the Equal Pay Act of 1963, President Kennedy stated it 
would bring awareness to “the unconscionable practice of paying female 
employees less wages than male employees for the same job.”
217
 Forty-six years 
later, President Barack Obama characterized the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Restoration Act as “only the beginning,” in the fight to ensure equal pay so that 
“our daughters have the same rights, the same chances, and the same freedom to 
pursue their dreams as our sons.”
218
 The fact that two presidents, separated by 
almost five decades, have made the same call for equal pay demonstrates the 
need for stronger legislation.
219
  
Prior to Chapter 546, plaintiffs rarely brought cases only under California’s 
Equal Pay Act,
220
 but now that the legislature enacted Chapter 546, state actions 
 
210. See Eilperin, supra note 201 (describing equal pay legislation as a means to bring awareness to 
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are more feasible and may open the door for more plaintiffs.
221
 Though the 
language in Chapter 546 will not affect how courts apply the law, its enactment is 
an extremely important step in the journey to wage equality because it raises 
awareness for business owners, employees, and society as a whole.
222
 Laws like 
Chapter 546 that promote equality become a part of the United States culture.
223
 
Echoing Presidents Kennedy and Obama, the fight for wage equality is not over 
and more needs to be done, but Chapter 546 is a step in the right direction.
224
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